

SOCIAL MOVEMENT TRANSNATIONALIZATION: A MULTI-LEVEL ATTAC

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ABSTRACT

Andrew S. Tompkins – Social Movement Transnationalization: A Multi-Level ATTAC
(Under the direction of Dr. Gary Marks)

This study attempts to gain insight into the relative importance of national and international political arenas to transnational social movement organizations. To do so, it examines the role of national contexts and the functions of the transnationalization processes of diffusion, internalization, and transnational collective action. The analysis is based on a case study of the anti-neoliberal globalization group ATTAC in the two countries where it is largest, France and Germany. The author looks at the differing national and international political opportunities that led to the emergence of ATTAC in each country, highlighting the importance of national contexts for the French organization and transnationalization processes for the German one. The study also includes an analysis of some of the campaigns conducted by the two national groups, emphasizing the role played by internalization and transnational collective action, which are sometimes synthesized in the solidarity actions of the different nationally bounded groups.

This paper is dedicated to the students, faculty, and staff of
Niimi Senior High School in Okayama prefecture, Japan.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The past decade has witnessed the emergence and development of a significant transnational social movement that opposes the current neoliberal trajectory of economic globalization. This movement frequently attempts to challenge global economic processes through collective action at the international level, with protests against supranational institutions like the World Trade Organization and activist conferences like the World Social Forum. At the same time, the organizations within this movement also conduct campaigns at the national level, in part because obstacles to coordination make it difficult to sustain international campaigns. In many ways, transnational organizations are confronted with a paradox in which “the constituency of social movements ‘thinks globally,’” but the movements themselves are “basically constrained to ‘act locally.’”¹ This is true even for one of the most successful organizations within this movement, the *Association pour la taxation des transactions financières pour l’aide aux citoyens*, known internationally by the acronym ATTAC. Its organizational network includes over 100,000 dues-paying members worldwide and national groups in more than 40 countries. However, it has no formal institutional structure at the international level and most of its campaigns take place within national political arenas. Thus, ATTAC, like many other transnational social movement organizations, finds itself caught between global issues and national politics.

¹ della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 20.

To what extent then are TSMOs like ATTAC genuinely “transnational”? Are they somehow “stuck” inside the nation-state? Which is more important to them on the whole, the national or international level? Definitive answers to these questions are beyond the scope of an article-length paper, but this thesis hopes to gain insights that might partially respond to such questions through a more modest study of the two largest national ATTAC groups, those in France and Germany. Specifically, this thesis analyzes the roles played by national contexts and the transnationalization processes of diffusion, internalization, and transnational collective action within ATTAC in an attempt to determine the functions and relative importance of each. I begin by providing background from some of the relevant theoretical literature on social movements in Chapter II before proceeding with my analysis of the impact of contexts and processes on ATTAC in the subsequent chapters. Chapter III consists of an examination of the political opportunities that led to the emergence of ATTAC France and ATTAC Germany, which demonstrates the primacy of national contexts for the former and the importance of diffusion and transnational collective action for the latter. Chapter IV studies the campaigns of both national groups and, in particular, their use of internalization and transnational collective action, which sometimes occur in hybridized form as “coordinated domestication.” Finally, Chapter V concludes with a brief summary of my findings.

CHAPTER II

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, AND GLOBALIZATION

Definitions

In looking at ATTAC as a transnational social movement organization, it is first useful to define the relevant terms. Dieter Rucht defines a *social movement* as “an action system comprised of mobilized networks of individuals, groups and organizations which... attempt to achieve or prevent social change, predominantly by means of collective protest.”² The concept of *network*, important to this definition, is used by both scholars and the movement actors they study to indicate a dynamic and non-hierarchical structure of interactions taking place between a heterogeneous mix of movement actors.³ These actors may include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mass membership groups, and unions, but social movements are more than the sum of these organizational parts, since they may also include informal groups, occasional contributors, unaffiliated activists, sympathizers, and so on. Nevertheless, *social movement organizations* (SMOs) represent “the backbone of any social movement”⁴ and academic studies of social movements tend to focus on SMOs like ATTAC rather than on the more nebulous movements themselves. Social movements with an initial focus on primarily domestic issues can become *transnational* through a process of upward scale shift, where their arguments are transposed onto the level of

² Rucht, 1999: 207.

³ “Networks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 4, 8).

⁴ Rucht, 1999: 207.

international politics and re-conceptualized in a global frame.⁵ Sidney Tarrow defines transnational social movements (TSMs) as “socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor.”⁶ Putting it another way, Rucht explains that “the transnational aspect could refer to various dimensions of a movement, such as issues, targets, mobilization, and organization, [but] even when one of these elements takes a transnational guise, the others may remain strictly national.”⁷ Because of this, one cannot automatically assume that TSMOs such as ATTAC are exclusively or even primarily focused on international politics.

Diffusion

An important part of the functioning of any transnational social movement is the spread of its ideas from one country to another. The transfer of TSMOs or of TSM issues, tactics, or discourse across national borders is known as *diffusion*. This transnationalization process occurs in both relational (direct) and non-relational (indirect) forms. Relational diffusion relies on existing linkages between individuals or groups, a fact which underscores the importance of activist networks to transnationalization. Non-relational diffusion involves learning from information conveyed by impersonal carriers like mass media.⁸ Both forms of diffusion depend on movements or transnational movement actors identifying with each other,⁹ and diffusion is more likely to occur when they share spatial proximity (i.e. a common

⁵ Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 123-124.

⁶ Tarrow, 2001: 11.

⁷ Rucht, 1999: 207.

⁸ Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 127; della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 6.

⁹ Tarrow and McAdam refer to this as “attribution of similarity.”

border) or cultural similarity (a common language, history, or colonial legacy) in addition to their broad movement interests.¹⁰ Diffusion also frequently occurs along an informal hierarchy, where smaller movements take cues from larger, more “advanced” ones elsewhere in a process that is usually “moved by identification and imitation rather than suggestion and contagion.”¹¹ Importantly, diffusion can only be successful “to the extent that (national) political opportunities are present... which are taking up the stimulus from abroad.”¹² Diffusion is the most basic of the social movement transnationalization processes.

Political Opportunities

Since transnational social movements operate at least partially within the international environment, they have at their disposal a broader range of options for applying pressure to their targets than do their purely domestic counterparts. Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi present a two-level model to explain transnational social movement targets, wherein movements in one country can interact with their own government, a foreign government, or a foreign social movement in order to apply pressure via transnational, transgovernmental, or cross-level pathways.¹³ This ability to “exert influence through tenacious campaigns that use possible levers at all levels” and the frequent formation of cross-issue and inter-movement alliances are characteristics that are more accentuated in transnational social movements than in domestic ones.¹⁴ However, the international environment that is the source of these

¹⁰ Even a superficial look at ATTAC’s global distribution demonstrates both such kinds of diffusion: the ten largest ATTAC groups are all located in Europe, and the only ATTAC group in North America is in French-speaking Québec. (ATTAC Deutschland, 2004: 50; ATTAC France 2002: 68)

¹¹ della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 7-8. The authors refer to these as the “proximity” and “hierarchy” models in their discussion of conditions for diffusion.

¹² Kriesi et al., 1995: xxii.

¹³ della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 5.

¹⁴ Rucht, 1999: 210-212.

strengths is also the source of several weaknesses: transnational social movements must contend with the much higher costs of international coordination; they are frequently compelled to organize across cultural differences, leading to a more heterogeneous composition and weaker collective identities; and they are even more heavily dependent on media than national social movements, as “most transnational movements exist for the wider audience only as far as they appear in the media.”¹⁵ Transnational social movements are therefore a distinctive category of social movement that are strongly shaped by the international environment.

While international politics has an important impact on the social movements that engage in it, transnational social movements are still very dependent on the national contexts from which they emerge. Though academics and movement actors alike argue that the historical primacy of the nation-state has been undermined in recent years by loss of sovereignty toward international institutions, nation-states continue to be more salient political arenas for citizens than intergovernmental or supranational bodies. Furthermore, linguistic barriers, cultural traditions, and the predominantly national-level organization of major news media everywhere make it difficult to effectively convey anything more than ambiguous symbols across multiple borders. Most importantly, nation-state structures continue to present some of the most important political opportunities for (as well as constraints on) social movement mobilization. A rich body of academic literature exists which traces the impact of national political opportunity structures (POSs) on social movements’ emergence, level of mobilization, targets, tactics, orientation, and chances for

¹⁵ Rucht, 1999: 207, 215-217, 221.

success or failure.¹⁶ Some traditionally important components of a country's POS include the relative openness or closure of political institutions and their capacity to repress those opposing them; the presence or absence of allies in government (usually left parties) that can facilitate the spread of movement claims; and the presence of pre-existing mobilizing structures that can speed and heighten the impact of mobilization.¹⁷ Domestic political opportunity structures are an important component of the national contexts from which even transnational movements emerge.

Political opportunities for social movements also exist at the international level. Supranational institutions often create opportunities that differ from those present at the national level, which allows movement actors to go “venue shopping” in search of the most powerful authority that is receptive to their demands. This is particularly important in systems of multi-level governance like the EU.¹⁸ Similarly, many social movements use the opportunities created by international institutions to gain leverage against their own unreceptive national governments, who they consider to be their primary targets.¹⁹ However, Sikkink points out that while “for some activists, international institutions are part of the solution, ... for others, they *are* the problem.”²⁰ Many of ATTAC's claims challenge trade and finance policies originating at the supranational level, and much of the anti-neoliberal globalization movement perceives international opportunities on such issues to be rather closed. According to Sikkink's analysis, social movement strategies in this case depend on whether domestic POSs are regarded as relatively open or closed compared to international

¹⁶ Kriesi et al., 1995; Marks and McAdam 1999: 99-104.

¹⁷ See in particular Kriesi, et al., 1995; della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 9; and Marks and McAdam, 1999: 99.

¹⁸ The EU as a system of multi-level governance is discussed in detail in Hooghe and Marks, 2001.

¹⁹ This is known as externalization. For one example, see Rootes, 2005.

²⁰ Sikkink, 2005: 156.

ones. If they are open, groups will see a democratic deficit in international institutions and will engage in a defensive transnationalization that aims “to minimize losses rather than to seek gains.”²¹ On the other hand, if domestic opportunities are also closed, there will be diminished chances of activism and groups will probably organize around related issues that they have better chances of affecting.²² Supranational institutions are therefore an important source of both opportunities and constraints on transnational social movements.

Internalization

An important strategy of TSMs in confronting closed international opportunities is to conduct campaigns at the national level that aim to affect global issues. “The playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally” is known as *internalization* or *domestication*.²³ Internalization is a very common transnationalization process for domestic actors with grievances against the EU;²⁴ one example of internalization of EU conflict is the 1992 protest by French farmers, who blockaded Euro-Disney outside Paris in response to proposed changes in the EU’s program of agricultural subsidies.²⁵ The prevalence of this form of transnationalization is explained in part by the fact that “in a multilayered polity which is developing at different speeds in multiple directions, such as the European Union, responsibility is often difficult to locate.”²⁶ However, even when such responsibility is

²¹ Sikkink, 2005: 163-164.

²² Sikkink, 2005: 159-161. Sikkink indicates that the most successful activism on fiscal policy “has been in the area of debt forgiveness, not monetary policy per se.”

²³ della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 4. Note that I use these terms interchangeably throughout this thesis, usually referring to the process in noun form as “internalization” and in verb or adjective form with an appropriate declension of “domestication.”

²⁴ See Imig and Tarrow, 2001b.

²⁵ Bush and Simi, 2001: 97, 102.

²⁶ della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 15.

correctly identified, internalization may be a suitable strategy because a movement's opponents may be difficult to target directly. This is the case for ATTAC and many other groups fighting trade and financial liberalization, because the institutions they identify as their opponents are often distant, opaque and unreceptive to their demands. Since national governments remain the "privileged intermediaries" between supranational institutions and citizens in all countries, it is often perfectly appropriate to hold national governments accountable for the actions of the international organizations in which they are members. Though internalization is a transnational process, its use seems to implicitly give greater weight to national rather than international political arenas. Internalization is often regarded as a limited form of transnationalization that occurs primarily when obstacles prevent groups from attacking international problems directly.

Globalization

The ascendancy of supranational institutions is but one part of the ongoing phenomenon known as "globalization." This term itself is fraught with ambiguity and has been invoked by different groups to denote a variety of different processes, including the internet-centered revolution in telecommunications; a decrease in global transportation costs (especially in the form of cheap airline tickets); the spread of Western cultural values through business, science, and the entertainment industry (sometimes referred to as "cultural imperialism"); tighter economic integration working to the advantage of multinational corporations (MNCs); and a concomitant decline in the sovereignty of nation-states, with power shifting from governments toward (even) less democratically accountable MNCs and supranational institutions.²⁷ According to Tarrow and McAdam, "no concept has created

²⁷ della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 3-4.

more confusion in the study of transnational contention than the umbrella term *globalization*.²⁸ The multiplicity of meanings accorded to the term is one further indication that the phenomena lumped together under it present both new opportunities and new constraints for social movements. It is also one reason why members of the so-called “anti-globalization” movement have fought to be recognized as “anti-corporate” or as a movement for “globalization from below.”²⁹ In their view, the term “anti-globalization” conflates their (leftist) opposition to neoliberal economics with (rightist) xenophobia—which is also increasing in response to changes wrought by “globalization.” The disputed concept of globalization and its desired future trajectory constitute the discursive focus of the TSM in which ATTAC takes part.

Transnational Collective Action

Faced with a “globalization” in which economic and political processes take place on a global scale, TSMs have in recent years increasingly sought to bring their opposition to the same level through what is known as *transnational collective action*. This usually occurs in the form of protest and involves “coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions.”³⁰ Transnational collective action is what most proponents of the idea of a “global civil society” (many members of ATTAC included) expect or would like to see more of. Numerous obstacles generally prevent such action from occurring, since geographic, linguistic, and other coordination problems make the threshold for participation in any form of international

²⁸ Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 123.

²⁹ In France, ATTAC was one of the prominent organizations pushing for use of the term *altermondialisme* to replace *anti-globalisation*; the *globalisierungskritische Bewegung* is the designation preferred by movements in Germany (Sommier, 2003: 31-32).

³⁰ della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 7.

politics much higher. However, transnational collective action appears to be on the rise.³¹ Protests against supranational bodies like the WTO, EU, or IMF have been the most consistent and obvious part of the movement against neoliberal globalization. Though most of the participants in these collective actions are people who live near the protest event and who engage in primarily domestic politics, more and more links between such “rooted cosmopolitans” in distant places are being formed and institutionalized. In particular, counter-summits like the World Social Forum (now arguably summits in their own right and, in my view, another form of transnational collective action) provide venues for establishing and maintaining transnational ties between social movement actors. Della Porta and Tarrow cite the global day of protest against the impending US invasion of Iraq on February 15, 2003 as the most dramatic recent example of transnational collective action.³² Importantly, the protesters who took part in this action and the coordinating infrastructure they used overlapped significantly with those of the anti-neoliberal globalization movement, indicating that some activist networks may be converging in such a way that similar transnational collective action may become more likely in the future.³³ Transnational collective action, which emphasizes international action to solve problems in the international political arena, is the most accomplished form of transnationalization and therefore the aspiration of most transnational social movements.

³¹ della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 6-10.

³² della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 227-228.

³³ Movement scholars speak of “flexible identities” and “multiple belongings” which seem to indicate that activist networks are growing in terms of size and the issues they attack. See della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 237 and Fillieule et al., 2004.

Social movements are a form of political mobilization that frequently exists outside of or in opposition to formal political structures. However, these movements and the organizations that take part in them are themselves heavily influenced by the presence or absence of political opportunities within formal structures, both at the national and international levels. Globalization and international politics present special opportunities for SMOs to diffuse and act on their ideas transnationally, but TSMOs also face special problems coordinating transnational collective action and are often forced to “domesticate” international problems and confront them within national political arenas. The following two chapters look at ATTAC France and ATTAC Germany and analyze the importance to them of national contexts and the ways they use the transnationalization processes of diffusion (the transnational transfer of ideas), internalization/domestication (national-level treatment of international problems), and transnational collective action (international protest or cross-national coordination of campaigns).

CHAPTER III

ATTAC: NATIONAL CONTEXTS, TRANSNATIONAL DIFFUSION, AND INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

As indicated above, ATTAC is a particularly visible *transnational social movement organization*, though the meaning of this designation is more nuanced than it appears on the surface. This chapter examines the origins of ATTAC France and ATTAC Germany. It will be shown that ATTAC France's early development was highly dependent on the specific national context from which it emerged, but that diffusion and transnational collective action created the opportunities that led to the creation and growth of ATTAC Germany.

ATTAC France: Development Within a Specifically French context

ATTAC France was the first ATTAC organization and it is still the largest and most influential with 30,700 members, almost one-third of the organization's international membership.³⁴ The particular strength of ATTAC France is due to the fact that it is actually a very "French" organization, meaning that it grew out of specific conditions in France and taps very effectively into its national context. ATTAC France originally began as an initiative of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, a major monthly newspaper of the French leftist

³⁴ Nikonoff, 2004.

intelligentsia with a considerable international following.³⁵ In December 1997, at the height of the Asian monetary crisis, editor Ignacio Ramonet asked in his monthly editorial, “Why not create, at the global level, an “Association for a Tobin Tax for the Aid of Citizens?””³⁶ The proposed NGO would work together with a broad range of other groups, including “unions and associations with cultural, social, or ecological aims,” to push for the implementation of a tax on international financial transactions. A surprisingly strong response to Ramonet’s appeal led to a preliminary meeting and Founding Conference in March and June 1998, which brought together “activists and organisations from across [France’s] non-institutional Left,” including other leftist papers (*Charlie Hebdo*, *Politis*), trade unions (FSU, Groupe des Dix, various SUD, CGT and CFDT groupings), solidarity organizations (AC!, Droits Devant!!), organizations for the socially excluded (Droit au Logement), environmentalists (Les amis de la Terre), feminists (CADAC), etc.³⁷ Also present were a number of “public intellectual figures” such as Susan George and representatives of *Le Monde Diplomatique*. The initial construction of ATTAC France created an umbrella organization for this heterogeneous mélange of civil society groups, intellectuals, and media, and focused their collective energies on a common, concrete goal.³⁸

The French civil society organizations that took part in founding ATTAC France were able to come together as quickly as they did because of pre-existing mobilization structures left over from earlier domestic campaigns. Of particular importance was the 1995 wave of

³⁵ *Le Monde Diplomatique* is currently published in 18 languages and more than 28 countries. It has partnerships with several daily leftist newspapers outside of France, and is delivered in local translation to subscribers of papers such as *The Guardian* in the United Kingdom and *die tageszeitung* in Germany.

³⁶ Ramonet, 1997.

³⁷ Waters, 2004: 859; ATTAC France, 2002: 171.

³⁸ ATTAC France was initially intended to be an umbrella network organization and not a membership organization (see ATTAC France, 2002: 161), but it quickly became a hybrid of these two.

strikes against the Juppé government, which brought newly radicalized unions together with other groups in civil society and played a “catalyzing role” in the development of the *altermondialiste* movement in France.³⁹ Though the 1995 actions had “virtually no international resonance,”⁴⁰ this contentious episode did arguably constitute the beginnings of an upward scale shift for the French movement organizations involved, as it helped to “create a consensus around certain questions,” many of which were framed for the first time in terms of globalization.⁴¹ Scale shift was further cemented in the late 1990s by a general recomposition of the movement Left⁴² and, even more powerfully, by the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). This international trade agreement was perceived as a “specific threat” to France’s protected cultural industries⁴³ and provoked broad mobilization even outside of this sector that led to the French government’s withdrawal from negotiations and the agreement’s consequent demise. The MAI campaign and other previous mobilizations served to build ties between French civil society groups in ad hoc, heterogeneous coalitions based primarily around national or “domesticated” international issues. The mobilization structures created by these earlier, more tenuous alliances were critical to ATTAC France’s success in “gather[ing] together so many diverse organizations—all proclaiming loud and clear their independence, their autonomy, and control over their own expression—within a common organization.”⁴⁴ ATTAC France was thus able to take

³⁹ Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer, 2005: 12.

⁴⁰ Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 122.

⁴¹ Contamin, 2005: 236, 233-237.

⁴² Sommier, 2003: 15, 35-129.

⁴³ Mouchard, 2005: 318.

⁴⁴ Magnin, 2001: 6.

advantage of its national context and serve as “a point of convergence for existing networks of militancy”⁴⁵ within France.

The second pillar of ATTAC France’s initial coalition was its intellectual component; this too is in many ways particular to the French national context. According to Sarah Waters, “French political tradition has always accorded a special status to intellectuals in the public sphere, which has no direct equivalent in other European countries.”⁴⁶ The first secretary-general of ATTAC France, Pierre Tartakowsky, sees the association as the latest successor in a long tradition of French intellectual activism dating back to Emile Zola and continuing throughout the 20th century with the likes of Sartre and Foucault.⁴⁷ Intellectuals are prominent within ATTAC, “all of [whose] leaders had previously published books on key political and social questions (Cassen, Tartakowsky, Aguiton, Nikonoff) or were public intellectual figures of international renown (ATTAC’s vice president, Susan George).”⁴⁸ Furthermore, intellectual production is integrated into the institutional architecture of ATTAC in the form of a Scientific Council, which formulates many of the group’s arguments and publishes books and articles on related topics.⁴⁹ ATTAC France defines itself as an “action-oriented movement of popular education”⁵⁰ and this intellectual-educational perspective is a source of its credibility, especially among political elites. In part because of the organization’s intellectual discourse, ATTAC France received facilitation and direct state

⁴⁵ Waters, 2004: 859.

⁴⁶ Waters, 2004: 862.

⁴⁷ “There are few cases in France where a newspaper actually produces an association, as it is usually the other way around. The major historical precedent is of course the Dreyfus Affair and the creation of the Human Rights League from Emile Zola’s appeal in the pages of *L’Aurore*” (Tartakowsky, quoted in Waters, 2004: 858).

⁴⁸ Waters, 2004: 861.

⁴⁹ ATTAC France, 2002: 110-111.

⁵⁰ ATTAC France, 2002: 31-34.

support, not just from the socialist government of Lionel Jospin, but even from conservative president Jacques Chirac and prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin.⁵¹ The direct involvement of academics, experts, and other intellectuals gives ATTAC a privileged role in public discourse in France.

ATTAC also benefited both nationally and internationally from its media connections in France. Of central importance to ATTAC France's development was *Le Monde Diplomatique*, a firmly established paper focused on international politics and sympathetic to leftist causes like the movement against neoliberal globalization.⁵² Within France, *Le Monde Diplomatique* also had at its disposal an activist association, *les Amis du Monde Diplomatique* (AMD), created in 1996 as part of the paper's campaign to gain financial independence from parent paper *Le Monde*.⁵³ AMD's network provided fertile ground for the growth of ATTAC, as demonstrated by the high frequency of dual membership in the two organizations early on.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the existing renown of *Le Monde Diplomatique* also served as a kind of glue to bind together the diverse array of groups that formed ATTAC France: Pierre Tartakowsky explains that the creation of the association at the initiative of a major monthly newspaper constitutes

an important inversion: in [France] it is usually movements that create their own newspapers. With Attac, the newspapers became involved and created a movement, which... played a decisive role in creating trust among the partners; this trust... had had more difficulty spreading over a professional terrain, such as in a union, without the presence of... the press.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Waters, 2004: 867-868. The organization was, however, careful to avoid (the appearance of) being instrumentalized by these politicians. See "Attac et le politique" (in ATTAC France, 2002: 25-30).

⁵² Szczepanksi-Huillery, 2005: 147-168.

⁵³ Szczepanksi-Huillery, 2005: 168.

⁵⁴ Szczepanksi-Huillery, 2005: 147.

⁵⁵ Quoted in Magnin, 2001: 62.

In addition to the domestic networking role it played at the founding of ATTAC, *Le Monde Diplomatique* “today provide[s] the association’s leaders with [a] tribune of choice and play[s] an important role in the diffusion of their analyses,”⁵⁶ especially within France, but also abroad. The involvement of *Le Monde Diplomatique* in the creation of ATTAC was thus highly consequential, “[implying] immediate access to intellectual resources, legitimacy, and organizational networks cutting across newspapers, parties, unions, associations, and countries.”⁵⁷ While the international reputation of *Le Diplo* was also important (see the section on ATTAC Germany below), the associated organizational network was firmly rooted in national alliances within France.

The emergence and growth of ATTAC France depended on a conjunction of nationally specific factors that included pre-existing mobilization structures among civil society groups, the privileged role of intellectuals in national discourse, and tight connections with the media. In many ways, it is hard to imagine ATTAC as it currently exists originating anywhere outside of France. However, this dependence on national context does not imply that the scope of ATTAC’s influence is limited to France. If the origins of ATTAC France demonstrate the continued importance of national contexts to TSMOs, the creation of ATTAC Germany demonstrates how social movements can expand through transnationalization processes when met with receptive actors elsewhere.

⁵⁶ Magnin, 2001: 62.

⁵⁷ Ancelovici, 2002: 438.

ATTAC Germany: Diffusion and Growth via Transnational Protest

Though ATTAC exists in over 40 countries, its membership is heavily concentrated in the 24 national organizations in Europe.⁵⁸ After ATTAC France, the second-largest national ATTAC organization is in Germany, with approximately 15,000 members (slightly less than half the size of ATTAC France). The origins of ATTAC Germany demonstrate the importance of diffusion from its immediate neighbor and, simultaneously, of transnational collective action. This section discusses the origins of ATTAC Germany and highlights the importance of these processes to its foundation and growth.

ATTAC Germany's own explanation of its origins makes reference to two causally related factors leading up to its formation: first, the creation of ATTAC France following Ramonet's editorial in *Le Monde Diplomatique*; and second, the coming-together of various German NGOs within a domestic networking association designed to imitate ATTAC France.⁵⁹ The foundation of ATTAC Germany was therefore a result of developments within both international and domestic political arenas, with transnational diffusion connecting the two. Internationally, ATTAC France had made an effort early on to render the organization's transnational aspirations structurally credible by inviting groups from around the world to a platform-drafting conference in late 1998.⁶⁰ The French association's direct connection to *Le Monde Diplomatique* also facilitated the diffusion of its ideas by providing a steady drumbeat of coverage for the growing organization, with some mention of ATTAC appearing nearly every month in the French edition and approximately every other month in the German

⁵⁸ ATTAC France, 2002: 68; Nikonoff, 2004.

⁵⁹ ATTAC Deutschland, 2004: 13-15.

⁶⁰ ATTAC Deutschland, 2004: 13-14; Greffe, Greffrath, and Schumann, 2002: 171.

edition from 1998 to 2000.⁶¹ Furthermore, the indisputable success of ATTAC within France made organizations in Germany and elsewhere feel “a need to emulate the French example.”⁶² To this end, the *Netzwerk zur demokratischen Kontrolle der Finanzmärkte* was formed in January 2000 to bring together a number of moderate German NGOs, including WEED (Weltwirtschaft und Entwicklung, a group focused on development), Kairos Europa (a religious charity), and Pax Christi (a Catholic peace group). The initial purpose, as with ATTAC France, was to link existing groups together in an umbrella organization and focus their energies on international trade and finance.⁶³ Though the new network did not immediately call itself ATTAC, “the relationship to the international ATTAC structures was desired from the beginning”⁶⁴ and, by Fall of the same year, the original name had been dropped in favor of one that matched that of its French counterpart.⁶⁵ According to Sven Giegold, a leading activist in ATTAC Germany, “all of the basic model” for ATTAC Germany, from issue-framing and strategies to organizational structure, “was copied” more or less directly from the French association.⁶⁶ Thus, the initial structures strongly resembled those of ATTAC France, with special representation of founding organizations in the group’s administration; mutual autonomy of national leadership and local committees; a Scientific Council to shape the group’s discourse and enhance its legitimacy; and an analogous set of

⁶¹ Based on a search of the paper’s archives from January 1998 (the first month after the publication of Ramonet’s editorial) to December 2000. From May 1998 to September 2000, ATTAC was mentioned at least once in all but three French editions, and in 17 of the 25 German editions.

⁶² ATTAC Deutschland, 2004: 14.

⁶³ ATTAC Deutschland, 2004: 14; Bergstedt, 2004: 14-15.

⁶⁴ Bergstedt, 2004: 14.

⁶⁵ Kolb, 2005a: 100.

⁶⁶ Giegold, 2005 (interview with the author). He notes, however, that the strong role of the president in the French organization was not copied and that the grassroots traditions of German social movements have also shaped ATTAC

decision-making bodies and procedures.⁶⁷ In the founding of ATTAC Germany, domestic German NGOs consciously imitated the example set internationally by ATTAC France and created an organization with remarkable similarities.

However, the constellation of domestic and international opportunities that led to ATTAC Germany's creation did not lead to immediate success for the group. For more than a year after the founding of the initial *Netzwerk*, the group saw paltry media coverage and attracted few new members. Even after shifting its efforts from networking as an umbrella organization to building mass membership, these difficulties continued and, as late as June 2001, the group counted fewer than 500 members.⁶⁸ According to political scientist Felix Kolb, who served as media spokesperson for ATTAC Germany at the time, things turned around due to changes in the group's media strategy that resulted from diffusion and the opportunities presented by transnational collective action. Specifically, ATTAC Germany decided to imitate the media strategy of ATTAC Sweden, which had harnessed press attention surrounding the joint IMF/World Bank meetings in Prague in 2000 to build its membership base and legitimacy.⁶⁹ The learning process that led to this decision occurred through direct diffusion, as "Oliver Moldenhauer, one of the core organizers of ATTAC Germany, learned about this media campaign *during the Prague protests* and later in

⁶⁷ ATTAC France, 2002: 162-171; Bergstedt, 2004: 14-15, 22-25. These initial structures have, however, evolved differently in France and in Germany. Dorothee Härlin and Felix Kolb (2005, interviews with the author), both members of ATTAC Germany, described ATTAC France as being more "hierarchical," with less input from local groups than the German organization now has. According to its own description, ATTAC France is characterized more by mutually autonomous relations than by hierarchical command, but pressure for structural reform in ATTAC France has been building for years and has been a major topic on the organization's agenda in Summer 2005.

⁶⁸ Kolb, 2005a: 96-97, 100-101; Bergstedt, 2004: 18. Kolb describes ATTAC Germany currently as a "hybrid of umbrella organization and mass membership organization" (2005a: 101).

⁶⁹ Grefe et al., 2002: 175.

personal conversations, when a member of ATTAC Sweden visited its sister organization.”⁷⁰

Thus, the new media strategy adopted by ATTAC Germany—to use media campaigns to ride the wave of coverage resulting from transnational protest events—was itself the result of relational diffusion occurring at the site of transnational collective action.

Subsequent transnational protests provided opportunities for ATTAC Germany to enact its new strategy. First, the EU summit in Gothenburg, Sweden, in June 2001 attracted press attention across Europe when violence on the part of a few protesters led to an overreaction by Swedish police, who fired live ammunition and seriously injured three protesters, including one German. The violence caused “enormous media publicity on the theme of violence and protest,” leading the domestic media in Germany to suddenly “discover” a movement to which it had heretofore devoted little attention.⁷¹ ATTAC Germany responded to the opportunity by publishing a statement emphasizing the need for nonviolent protest and presented itself to the German press as “a representative organization of the global justice movement stressing its international character”—despite the fact that ATTAC Germany was hardly present at Gothenburg.⁷² ATTAC Germany’s credibility was very much enhanced by (if not wholly dependent on) its links to the TSMO whose name it shared: ATTAC France, already well-known internationally, had also just published a statement distancing itself from violent protest;⁷³ ATTAC Sweden had been among the important organizers at Gothenburg; and several European ATTAC groups were involved in planning the protests against the G8 conference in Genoa that were to take place the

⁷⁰ Kolb, 2005a: 110-111. My emphasis.

⁷¹ ATTAC Deutschland, 2004: 15-16.

⁷² Kolb, 2005a: 110.

⁷³ ATTAC France, 2002: 41-44.

following month.⁷⁴ ATTAC Germany therefore benefited from international opportunities created by the prior efforts of ATTAC groups elsewhere. As a result of its borrowed strategy and credibility, ATTAC Germany attracted 200 new members in the month of June, after having barely managed to sustain an average growth of 30 new members a month in the previous six months.⁷⁵ The July 2001 Genoa G8 summit presented an immediate opportunity to build further momentum. Though it was again unable to send many of its own members to the protests,⁷⁶ ATTAC Germany ensured that those who went were “ready and willing to talk to journalists” and serve as interview partners. It also offered special services to journalists, letting them ride buses with ATTAC protesters, sending them email and SMS updates, and keeping its press office in Germany open for the duration of the events.⁷⁷ The violence of Gothenburg repeated itself on a larger scale in Genoa, with police actually killing one demonstrator, and the G8 summit protests became an even more important media event.⁷⁸ ATTAC’s cultivated media prominence allowed the still small organization to quickly double its membership and it thereafter continued to grow by about 500-600 new members a month.⁷⁹ The organization subsequently conducted similar media campaigns at transnational protests in Brussels, Barcelona, and Luxemburg.⁸⁰ Transnational collective action was

⁷⁴ Kolb, 2005a: 115.

⁷⁵ Kolb, 2005a: 101-102.

⁷⁶ Bergstedt, 2004: 18; Kolb, 2005a: 111.

⁷⁷ Kolb, 2005a: 110-111.

⁷⁸ Much of the violence was later attributed to Italian security forces, who were accused of collaboration with right-wing extremists and the use of *agents provocateurs* to justify a crackdown; as a result of the investigations, Genoa continued to attract media attention even months later (WDR, 2002).

⁷⁹ Bergstedt, 2004: 18; Kolb, 2005a: 101-102.

⁸⁰ Kolb, 2005a: 120; Kolb indicates, however, that later protest events were not as important as Gothenburg and Genoa to the growth ATTAC Germany.

therefore critical to the growth of ATTAC Germany, not only as a site for the diffusion of ideas, but also as a political opportunity.

The early history of ATTAC Germany demonstrates the importance of extra-national factors in ATTAC's expansion from France into Germany. The transnationalization processes of diffusion and transnational collective action were critical not only to the spread of ideas, but also to the creation of media opportunities that made the group's audience—the German public—more receptive to such ideas. By contrast, ATTAC France was more directly dependent on the specificities of its national context. Much of its success was due to the use of pre-existing mobilization structures, domestic intellectual discourse, and media networks in France. The next chapter discusses cooperation between the French and German national groups and how they utilize the processes of internalization and transnational collective action in conducting and coordinating their campaigns.

CHAPTER IV

CAMPAIGNS: TRANSNATIONAL ACTION OR SHARED INTERNALIZATION?

The origins of the French and German instances of ATTAC indicate the importance of national contexts and the international opportunities created by transnationalization processes to the emergence of TSMOs like ATTAC. This chapter examines the use of the processes of internalization and transnational collective action in some of the recent campaigns of ATTAC France and ATTAC Germany.

Use of Internalization

Given the national-level organization of both ATTAC France and ATTAC Germany, it is relatively unsurprising that the campaigns of both groups should make considerable use of internalization (whereby international issues are brought into the national political arena). This perhaps limited transnationalization strategy is used frequently because of the near absolute closure of the relevant international institutions to ATTAC's demands (WTO, IMF, the European Commission,⁸¹ etc.), which makes it more logical to target the French or German government, even if political opportunities there are also limited.⁸² In fact, research

⁸¹ The openness of international institutions varies across issues. Marks and McAdam note that the EU Commission "is open, far more open than most national administrations, but it is highly selective" and "all groups [working with the Commission] are pressured to pose their claims in ways that are commensurate with market building" (1999: 105, 107). Since ATTAC sees one of its major goals as preventing public goods from being placed in the market, there is unlikely to be much openness in the EU's most powerful body to ATTAC's arguments.

⁸² della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 13.

by Fredrik Uggla indicates that most campaigns by ATTAC groups in France and Sweden (especially France) target national governments rather than international actors.⁸³ This holds true even for the Europe-wide ATTAC campaign against the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): in a typical French ATTAC article about the trade agreement, readers are exhorted to “demand *of the French government*” that it act on their behalf within the international system (by pressuring other EU governments to suspend GATS negotiations) and that it also create better opportunities at home (by organizing parliamentary and citizen debates on GATS and the WTO);⁸⁴ similarly, a position paper by ATTAC Germany on the GATS addresses its demands to the European Union and the German federal government.⁸⁵ Domestication occurs not only in the strict sense of *targeting* domestic actors for problems that have their origins in supranational institutions, but also in terms of highlighting the national consequences of international policies. For example, ATTAC France’s GATS campaign is closely linked to a parallel campaign on behalf of public services. A document on the GATS makes this connection explicitly and emphasizes the dual national/transnational strategy needed to confront the problem, stating that “only citizens can, *by mobilizing in their countries and in coalitions crossing national borders*, prevent the destruction of public services.”⁸⁶ ATTAC France’s use of domestication thus emphasizes the mutual dependence of national and transnational politics. ATTAC Germany has also conducted important campaigns on national themes, focusing first on the German health and pension systems, then more broadly on the uncertain fate of welfare state functions under the Social

⁸³ Uggla, 2004: 11-14.

⁸⁴ ATTAC France, 2000. Emphasis added to the quoted text.

⁸⁵ ATTAC Deutschland, 2002.

⁸⁶ ATTAC France, 2003. My emphasis.

Democratic/Green Party coalition government's Agenda 2010 program. Here again, the connection is always made between national politics and global processes. For example, Peter Wahl of ATTAC Germany states quite bluntly that "Agenda 2010 is [pure] neoliberalism" and goes on to explain that even though "globalization is not the only factor that influences the welfare system and job market... the dismantling of the welfare state can only be understood in connection with globalization."⁸⁷ All of these examples of internalization demonstrate efforts by ATTAC to make global issues locally relevant. Uggle suggests that this occurs because TSMOs like ATTAC must "search for demands and questions that will serve to mobilise supporters and attract additional adherents... In practice, such concerns are likely to be issues that are to a high degree located at the national level."⁸⁸ Furthermore, national-level campaigns are necessary for building and maintaining the local membership base that makes ATTAC able to function at higher levels; according to Sven Giegold, groups like ATTAC "must have a presence at the national level in order to accomplish anything internationally."⁸⁹ Internalization is therefore not only a frequently used strategy within ATTAC, but one which anchors the national groups to their local constituencies.

Use of Transnational Collective Action

Alongside internalization, transnational collective action is also important to ATTAC. The first "international" ATTAC event, spearheaded by ATTAC France in coalition with

⁸⁷ ATTAC Deutschland, 2004: 25-26.

⁸⁸ Uggle, 2004: 19; Felix Kolb sees a similar trend toward increasingly domestic campaigns in ATTAC Germany, which he attributes both to external circumstances (Sept. 11th, 2001 and ATTAC's subsequent involvement with the peace movement) and a "conscious decision" to increase national targets, in part for the purpose of expanding ATTAC Germany's national constituency (2005b, telephone interview with the author).

⁸⁹ Giegold, 2005 (interview).

groups forming elsewhere, was a counter-summit to the 1999 World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos.⁹⁰ The event was used as both an opportunity to protest against global economic policies and as a media opportunity through which ATTAC could diffuse its ideas to a wider audience. Subsequent protests against the EU and G8 increased the media resonance of this kind of transnational collective action for a time (especially after the 1999 WTO summit in Seattle), but they were also significant as sites of relational diffusion. The World Social Forum (WSF), a counter-summit to the WEF, is now the most important such event, annually drawing thousands of movement organizations for conferences, workshops, and the opportunity to build networks across the North-South divide. The first WSF, in Porto Alegre, Brazil, was organized by an international coalition, the core of which consisted of several Brazilian NGOs and *Le Monde Diplomatique*, with considerable indirect support from ATTAC France. Significantly, the WSF is more than a mere *opportunity* to network transnationally, it is also one of the sites where ATTAC coordinates its international operations. Since ATTAC does not possess any formal international structure, members of the national groups come together once a year at an international ATTAC meeting held on the sidelines of the World Social Forum.⁹¹ Within Europe, the national ATTAC groups have additionally utilized the bi- or tri-annual EU summits and occasional European G8 meetings to similar ends.⁹² Transnational collective action⁹³ is thus useful to ATTAC as a source of media opportunities, a site of relational diffusion, and a venue for coordination.

⁹⁰ Grefe et al., 2002: 171.

⁹¹ ATTAC Deutschland, 2004: 36-37.

⁹² It is important to note that these are no longer the *exclusive* sites of European ATTAC coordination. Maxime Combes of ATTAC Campus Paris and Dorothee Härlin of ATTAC Berlin (2005, interviews) mentioned meetings in Norway and Turkey that were not at protest sites.

⁹³ Note that my use of the term “transnational collective action” here encompasses both transnational protests and transnational social forums. Sven Giegold (2005, interview) points out that coordination at protest sites is

“Coordinated Domestication” and the Campaign Against the EU Constitution

However, transnational cooperation within ATTAC is not limited to the occasional mass protest event or international conference. Nor does the extensive use of internalization mentioned above imply that national campaigns are disconnected or only thematically related. In fact, Uggla describes much of ATTAC’s transnational work as “an internationally coordinated form of domestication.”⁹⁴ This kind of cooperation occurs when ATTAC groups in different countries issue joint statements or hold international conferences together to address local problems of common concern. One example connected to the previously mentioned GATS/public services campaigns is the recent call by ATTAC France for a “European convention of local collectives for the promotion of public services,” with promised attendance from ATTAC groups from Germany, the UK, Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, and Switzerland.⁹⁵ Among European ATTAC groups, EU policies frequently provide the link that connects local issues in multiple national arenas. The EU Services Directive drafted by former commissioner Fritz Bolkestein provoked anxiety in both France and Germany because of its potential impact on public services and wage competition from the new member states of Eastern Europe. As a result, members of several ATTACs decided at an international seminar in Innsbruck in December 2004 to use the Bolkestein debate as a focus for decentralized cooperation among their groups.⁹⁶ Thus, an important

difficult because “there are always too many things going on, there is never time, never calmness,” but that social forums are vital to coordination because “everyone is there, it is easy to network, and there is a high incentive to come.”

⁹⁴ Uggla, 2004: 16.

⁹⁵ ATTAC France, 2005b.

⁹⁶ Schwarz, 2005 (telephone interview); Gerold Schwarz is one of the leading members of ATTAC Germany involved in this project.

part of ATTAC's transnational work consists of connecting together domesticated issues in different countries.

The complicated interplay of internalization and transnational collective action in the form of coordinated domestication is perhaps best demonstrated by the recent Europe-wide ATTAC campaign against the EU Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was submitted to a referendum in some countries (France, Spain, the Netherlands, etc.), but not in others (notably including Germany), meaning that the political opportunities for ATTAC to effectively oppose it were distributed very unevenly among European countries. Early on, ATTAC France mounted a national campaign focused on the domestic consequences of the treaty, linking it to the recent national controversy over the Bolkestein directive and the related campaign for French public services. Following early surveys which indicated the TCE might not pass in the French referendum, several ATTAC groups in different countries decided to work together to cement the French “no” vote.⁹⁷ One part of their transnational campaign included a program of “volunteers from the European ATTAC groups for a ‘no’ to the European ‘constitution,’”⁹⁸ which sent speakers from Germany, Spain, Belgium, Italy, and elsewhere to public debates in France to explain the reasons for opposition to the treaty in their own countries.⁹⁹ German opponents of the TCE were particularly angry that no referendum was held in their own country and some of the volunteers carried this domestic theme over into France. In addition, local groups in ATTAC Germany initiated a print campaign which reiterated this theme: the “*Faces du non*”

⁹⁷ According to Schwarz, the surveys in question were discussed at a preparatory meeting for a large transnational protest in Brussels related to the Bolkestein directive (2005, interview).

⁹⁸ ATTAC France, 2005a.

⁹⁹ Schwarz, 2005 (interview); Schwarz was one of the leading organizers behind the “*Faces du non*” campaign; he also spoke on behalf of ATTAC Germany at the April 30th international ATTAC conference (see below).

flyers showed pictures of Germans who opposed the treaty and explained (in French) that France would not be the “black sheep” of Europe if it rejected the TCE, because many Germans would have opposed it had they been given the opportunity to vote on it (see Figures 1 and 2). The broad Europe-wide campaign also made use of transnational collective action in the form of conferences and protests. On April 30th, one month before the referendum vote, ATTAC France hosted an international conference in Paris, entitled “Let’s give the ‘no’ vote that Europe and the world need.” There, some of the European volunteers, alongside other speakers from Burundi, Venezuela, Tunisia, and the United States, gave speeches to a primarily French audience about how the TCE would affect their own countries or the relationship between them and Europe. Other transnational actions included a protest outside the Bundestag on the day of parliamentary ratification vote in Germany,¹⁰⁰ and a symbolic joint protest on the bridge connecting the French city of Strasbourg with Kehl in Germany.¹⁰¹ This cooperation was mutually beneficial for the different national ATTAC groups that took part in it: for ATTAC France, the cooperation with ATTAC Germany and others in this campaign enhanced the legitimacy of its arguments; for ATTAC Germany, the linking of its domestic campaign against the EU treaty to a separate national campaign targeting the French public allowed it to partially overcome the lack of favorable opportunities it faced at home. Overall, the Franco-German cooperation within ATTAC in the EU Constitutional Treaty referendum demonstrates a synthesis of internalization and transnational collective action in the form of coordinated domestication.

¹⁰⁰ According to Sven Giegold (2005, interview), demonstrators chanted slogans in French (“*tous ensemble, tous ensemble! non! non!*”) for part of the protest in Berlin.

¹⁰¹ ATTAC Deutschland, 2005; French-language copies of the referenced flyer were distributed at the April 30th ATTAC Conference in Paris.




Figure 1: Les Faces du Non flyer

The text at the bottom states (in French) that “In Germany, we cannot vote against the constitution, but YOU can—vote ‘NO.’ We say yes to a social Europe, a just Europe, a Europe of peace, but ‘NO’ to this constitution.”

The processes of internalization and transnational collective action within ATTAC are both important to the functioning of its national organizations. The former is vital to the development and maintenance of local constituencies that give the organization the strength necessary to act at the international level, while the latter serves as a source of opportunities for diffusion (both relational and non-relational) and coordination. Interestingly, these processes often combine in ways that make it difficult to distinguish the importance of national and international levels of governance to ATTAC. If, as Uggle’s research

demonstrates, ATTAC groups seem to target national political arenas more frequently than the international, campaigns like the one against the EU Constitution show that they are not necessarily confining themselves to their *own* national arenas.



Figure 2: *Les Faces du Non* flyer (detail)

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

ATTAC is one of the largest organizations within the transnational social movement that opposes neoliberal globalization. To the extent that it is representative of this movement, an examination of its development and campaigns in France and Germany reveals several trends regarding the importance of national contexts for anti-neoliberal globalization TSMOs and their use of transnationalization processes. As the case of ATTAC France demonstrates, national contexts are vitally important to the initial emergence of TSMOs. ATTAC France was able to bring together its founding coalition because of a scale shift in the mid-1990s for French domestic organizations, prior cooperation that created mobilization structures, the privileged role of its intellectual partners, media access, and existing networks which connected these different groups within the national political arena. National contexts were less important to the creation of ATTAC Germany, because the organizational model was diffused from France and transnational collective action provided the opportunities that allowed the group to grow. Even so, the national political arena was very important, as it was the *domestic* media resonance of transnational protest that provoked the influx of new members that occurred after the Gothenburg and Genoa protests. The campaigns of ATTAC France and ATTAC Germany also demonstrate a mixture of national context dependency and international action. To borrow a metaphor from Berlin ATTAC

member Dorothee Härlin, ATTAC's work is like a tree, with local/national action constituting the roots and international action being the fruit: since no supranational structures yet exist for a "global civil society," TSMOs must grow strong within the national arena before they are able to act at the international level. The transnationalization process of internalization allows groups like ATTAC to build the necessary national constituencies by presenting local problems as the result of supranational policies. Transnational collective action, both as protest and as forum, is a source of multiple opportunities for social movements. Such events provide opportunities for networking (relational diffusion), media coverage (non-relational diffusion; especially at protest events), and coordination of campaigns (especially at forums). Often, the activities of ATTAC groups fall short of pure transnational collective action, but surpass the limitations implicit in the process of internalization. The example of the recent campaign against the EU treaty suggests ways in which these two processes can combine. When this occurs, TSMOs are never fully in the international arena (because they are working on problems that they see within their own domestic societies), but nor are they completely trapped within the nation-state (because they are cognizant of international linkages and actively express transnational solidarity). On balance, it seems that involvement in national politics is actually more important to TSMOs like ATTAC than direct work at the international level. However, their use of transnational processes deliberately blurs the boundaries between nation-state political arenas as well as the distinction between the national and international level. This makes it possible for what Keck and Sikkink have stated regarding social movement theory to hold true for social movement discourse as well: ATTAC's ideas increasingly "travel well from domestic to transnational relations precisely because to do so, they do not have to travel at all..." ATTAC

and others like it are consciously and deliberately “throw[ing] off the fiction of the unitary state as seen from the outside.”¹⁰²

¹⁰² Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 32.

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